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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal in this post-conviction proceeding, Wayne D. Anderson, II, asserted
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motions to proceed as a pro se
litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend time to prepare an amended
petition, because the district court did not recognize his right to self-representation.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Anderson had not shown the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motions, because he did not show
any valid basis for discharging his appointed counsel or further delaying the case.
(Resp. Br., pp.5-10.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address certain of the State’s arguments.
Contrary to the State’s argument that the motions were untimely, Mr. Anderson asserts
the motions were timely filed. Further, the State contends any abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel was harmless because the
district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to extend time to prepare
petition.

Despite that argument, Mr. Anderson asserts his substantial rights were

prejudiced because he was left unable to exercise his right to self-representation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Anderson’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motions to
proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his time to
prepare an amended petition?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s Motions To
Proceed As A Pro Se Litigant, Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, And Extend His Time
To Prepare An Amended Petition
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his
time to prepare an amended petition.

The district court did not recognize

Mr. Anderson’s right to self-representation. Mr. Anderson had a right to proceed pro se.
(See generally App. Br., pp.9-12.) As a corollary to his right to self-representation,
Mr. Anderson had a right to dismiss court-appointed counsel.

(See generally App.

Br., pp.12-14.) The district court abused its discretion when it denied those motions
because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motion
to extend his time to prepare an amended petition. (See generally App. Br., pp.15-16.)
Because Mr. Anderson chose to proceed pro se but was not present at the status
conference, he needed a continuance to exercise his right to self-representation, and
being left unable to exercise that right meant Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were
prejudiced by the denial of the motion.
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Anderson’s requests “were
untimely,” because he did not ask to proceed pro se “until approximately six months
after the court granted his motion for appointment of counsel, approximately two and
one-half months after the court entered its notice of intent to summarily dismiss the
petition, and only after [Mr.] Anderson’s appointed counsel requested, and was granted,
two extensions of time to respond to the court’s notice.” (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (citations
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omitted).) The State contends the district court “appropriately considered the late timing
of [Mr.] Anderson’s request, and acted within its discretion to prevent further delays.”
(Resp. Br., p.9 (citation omitted).)
Contrary to the State’s argument, Mr. Anderson’s motions were timely filed.
Mr. Anderson submitted the motions for mailing on October 8, 2015, before the
October 10, 2015 deadline set by the district court when it granted post-conviction’s
counsel request for a second extension of time to respond to the notice of intent to
dismiss. (See R., pp.102-03, 106.) Pursuant to the “mailbox rule,” which provides
documents are deemed filed by pro se inmates when the documents are submitted for
mailing, the motions were timely filed as of October 8, 2015. See Munson v. State, 128
Idaho 639, 643 (1996) (holding “the mailbox rule applies for purposes of pro se inmates
filing petitions for post-conviction relief”).
Further, considering post-conviction counsel requested both extensions to get
“additional time in which to respond to the Court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss the petition
in this matter” (see R., pp.92, 99), Mr. Anderson would have reasonably expected postconviction counsel to file a response. Thus, even if the October 10, 2015, deadline did
not apply, the time for Mr. Anderson to file the motions would not have started to accrue
until Mr. Anderson learned post-conviction counsel did not actually intend to file a
response to the notice of intent to dismiss. (See also Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-25
(post-conviction counsel informing the district court he had previously advised
Mr. Anderson he was not going to file an amended petition, and the witnesses
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Mr. Anderson had given him did not change his position).)

Under the unique

circumstances of this case, Mr. Anderson’s motions were timely filed.1
The State also contends, “even if the district court abused its discretion by failing
to permit [Mr.] Anderson to discharge his appointed counsel, such error is harmless
because the court, as discussed above, acted well within its discretion in denying
[Mr.] Anderson’s motion for a continuance.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State argues, “even if
[Mr.] Anderson had the right to discharge his counsel, his post-conviction petition would
still have been summarily dismissed after the district court denied the motion to continue
the case. Therefore, [Mr.] Anderson cannot demonstrate prejudice.” (Resp. Br., p.10.)
Despite the above argument, Mr. Anderson asserts his substantial rights were
prejudiced because he was left unable to exercise his right to self-representation.
Under the State’s argument, the district court abused its discretion by not permitting
Mr. Anderson to dismiss court-appointed counsel, but nonetheless properly denied the
motion to extend his time to prepare an amended petition (i.e., a motion to allow
Mr. Anderson to exercise his right to self-representation after dismissing counsel).

The State additionally argues, “[e]ven in the context of the established constitutional
right of self-representation at a criminal trial, a court may consider the timeliness of the
request for self-representation in determining whether to grant the request.” (Resp.
Bar., p.8 (citing State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597 (Ct. App. 2007).)
However, that timeliness standard as articulated by the federal appellate courts
generally provides “a demand for self-representation is timely if made before meaningful
trial proceedings have begun.” E.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir.
1986); accord United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1991). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, “[t]he right of a defendant in a criminal
case to act as his own lawyer is unqualified if invoked prior to the start of the trial.”
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1007 (1966). Mr. Anderson submits the post-conviction summary disposition
stage, as part of the proceedings before a possible evidentiary hearing, is equivalent to
the pretrial stage of a criminal case. Thus, even by analogy to the constitutional
standard for criminal cases, Mr. Anderson’s motions were timely filed.
1
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Further, Mr. Anderson was not present at the status conference where the district
court denied the motion to extend time to prepare petition. (R., p.107.) Thus, if the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss court-appointed
counsel, the State’s argument would mean it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to deny the motion to extend time to prepare petition even though
Mr. Anderson lacked any real representation at the status conference.

This Court

should reject the State’s harmlessness argument because it would create such
anomalous situations.
The State has not shown the district court’s abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel was harmless. The denial of the motion to
extend his time to prepare an amended petition meant Mr. Anderson was unable to
exercise his right to self-representation and file an amended petition or other response
to the notice of intent to dismiss. The surrounding circumstances therefore indicate
Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the denial of his motion to extend
time to prepare petition.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s order and
judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, reverse the district court’s order
denying his motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel,
and extend time to prepare an amended petition, and remand the matter to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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